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Through the Eyes of Mad Men
Simulation, Interaction, and Ethics
Mitchell Aboulafia
AUTHOR'S NOTE
A version of this article was presented as the Keynote Address at the 65th Annual
Mountain-Plains Philosophy Conference, Denver, Colorado, October 2011. I wish to thank
Candice Shelby and Catherine Kemp for their suggestions.
1 Not long ago I began to read in earnest about the simulation and theory theory or folk
psychology  debate  in  cognitive  science. I  was  led  to  this  debate  in  researching
contemporary  approaches  to  agency in  social  psychology.  Quite  coincidently  I  found
myself  watching the television series  Mad Men.  For those of  you unfamiliar  with the
series, the title refers to the ad men primarily on Madison Avenue in the 1960’s. How
fortunate, I thought, to be watching a show about a profession in which the name of the
game is simulation or mindreading of a sort, and not only from individual to individual
but from individual to groups. If anyone has a better than average ability to mindread –
for example, to determine the beliefs and predict the decisions of others – it would be
these folks. Now I realize that there is a danger of confusing fiction with fact by appealing
to a TV series, but good fiction, which by and large this series has been, is often nuanced
in dealing with interpersonal relationships, consolidating our own experiences in well-
crafted scenes. Such scenes can help to illuminate theories of mindreading in a manner
that parallels more traditional thought experiments.  And let me assure the reader in
advance that my use of Mad Men will not require you to have watched the show. 
2 I will address important features of simulation theory in order to argue that many of its
most valuable insights can be found in a tradition influenced by George Herbert Mead.
But my interests here are not merely antiquarian. I intend to show that a neo-Median
model of how we relate to others can highlight weaknesses in simulation theory. It can
also assist in addressing ethical questions in a more sophisticated and comprehensive
way than simulation theory, whether it is the hybrid model defended by Alvin I. Goldman
Through the Eyes of Mad Men
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, III-2 | 2011
1
or the transformation approach of Robert M. Gordon. My goal is to entice readers into
considering how a neo-Meadian framework might  offer a  productive path for  future
reflections and research in ethics. 
3 Before  drawing  on  some examples  from Mad  Men to  illustrate  aspects  of  simulation
theory, it’s appropriate to let two influential simulation theorists say a few words about
how they view their models. We turn first to Alvin Goldman and his understanding of the
differences between simulation theory and theory theory, and then to Robert Gordon. Of
course  their  positions  contain  nuances  that  can’t  be  captured  by  relatively  brief
quotations. Nevertheless, these carefully crafted summary statements will help to set the
stage. I quote first from Goldman’s response to criticisms of his book, Simulating Minds,
made by Perner and Brandl.
Suppose an attributor wishes to mindread a target’s decision. If she uses simulation,
she will generate a “pretend” decision of her own, extract that decision, and project
it onto the target. If she uses theory, on the other hand, she will not produce a
pretend – or  genuine –  decision at  all.  She will  form a belief  about  the target’s
decision,  based  on  purely  factual  or  theoretical  reasoning  from  her  (the
attributor’s)  beliefs  about  the  targets  prior  preferences,  prior  beliefs,  and
psychological laws. (Goldman 2009: 478)
4 Early in his recent book, Simulating Minds, Goldman spells out his understanding of the
basics of simulation with regard to decision making in this way. 
Predicting another’s decision is a stock example that ST aims to explain. It says that
an attributor goes about this task by imaginatively putting herself into the target’s
shoes. She pretends to have the same initial states – for example, the same desires
and beliefs – and then makes a decision given those initial, pretend states. Having
made  a  decision  in  the  pretend  mode,  the  attributor  predicts  that  this  is  the
decision that the target will make. (Goldman 2006: 19)
5 Properly speaking this sort of mindreading – one that involves pretence, imagination, and
prediction – is  high-level  simulation.  This  is  distinguished from low-level  simulation,
which is a relatively primitive form of simulation for Goldman, one that involves, for
example, reading basic emotions from facial expressions. This distinction is not accepted
by all  simulation theorists.  Further,  Goldman is  challenged by one of  the parents  of
simulation theory regarding a basic feature of his account. According to Robert Gordon,
simulation doesn’t involve turning to one’s own mental states in order to help determine
what  the  other  is  thinking.  Gordon  understands  simulation  in  terms  of  the
transformation of oneself into the other. The exemplary case is that of the actor who
transforms himself into the character he is playing. Shaun Gallagher presents Gordon’s
position in the following fashion. 
I  do not  retreat  introspectively  to  my own mind to  run simulation routines  by
manipulating propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires. Rather, I put myself in
the other person’s perspective and look to see what she thinks is true about the
world. This involves a transformation that takes place on the personal level.  By
using my imagination, I imagine/simulate what the other person must think in her
situation. I do not imagine myself in her situation; I imagine her in her situation, by
imaginatively occupying her situation. The transformation involves an egocentric
shift,  but  does  not  involve  either  introspection of  my  own  mental  states,  or
inference making about the other’s mental states. I am not concerned with mental
states at all. I imagine, in the first-person, how the other person sees the world.
(Gallagher 2007: 66-7)
Through the Eyes of Mad Men
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, III-2 | 2011
2
6 Gordon’s position can be seen as responding to Daniel  Dennett and others who have
claimed that Goldman’s model is open to the standard critiques that have been leveled
against approaches to mindreading that employ analogy. In Gordon’s words, 
One reason I emphasize transformation is that a number of writers, both pro and
con the simulation theory, take simulation to involve an implicit inference from
oneself to others. It is essentially the old argument from analogy, which requires
that you first recognize your own mental states, perhaps under certain imagined
hypothetical conditions, and then infer that the other is in similar states. (Gordon
1995: 734)
7 Needless to say, Goldman has a retort, and is unwilling to cede ground on the importance
of some form of introspection for the simulation process. In responding to Gordon, he
states, “Thus, as I interpret ST, it naturally invites an introspective approach to first-
person  attribution  […].  [T]here  is  empirical  evidence  that  third-person  mindreading
involves use of a brain region responsible for self-reference or self-reflection” (Goldman
2006: 187). 
8 Having briefly outlined some of the features of simulation theory, and with caveats that
Goldman views his theory as a hybrid, employing both simulation and folk psychology,
and that Gordon is quite prepared to acknowledge that hypothetical reasoning has a place
in mindreading, we turn to Mad Men.1
9 The central character in Mad Men is Don Draper. He is a whiz at figuring out what will
motivate  people  to  buy  products.  But  his  talent  appears  to  be  mysterious  to  his
colleagues. They stand in awe of how quickly he can determine the right move. We, the
audience, have more information about Don than do his colleagues. We know that Don
Draper was originally born Dick Whitman. We know that he has lived most of his adult
life under an assumed name. We also know enough about his biography – his traumatic
childhood, his abusive father – to suggest why he might be so good at his job. He is a
person who has had to pay close attention to others in order to survive, first as a child
and then as an adult pretending to be someone else. There are four scenes from the show
that I wish to discuss, three directly involving Don. 
10 Scene one (Mad Men, 2009A). Conrad Hilton has called Don to his hotel suite. They had met
at a party but Don didn’t know at the time that the man behind a bar, Connie, was Conrad
Hilton. It seems that Connie has now tracked him down and wants to talk. He suspects
that Don might be really good at his profession. This could be big business for Don. It’s
Hilton, after all.  Within minutes of entering the suite, Connie wants Don to give him
advice on an ad campaign. Don resists. He says to Connie, “I think that you wouldn’t be in
the presidential suite right now if you worked for free.” Hilton pushes back. “Don, this is
friendly.” Don retorts,  “Connie,  this  is  my profession;  what do you want me to do?”
Connie wants him to give him one for free. The mock-ups for the ads are right in front of
them on the coffee table. Don lights a cigarette and takes an effortless look. They show
hotels with friendly mouse mascots in the foreground. Don briefly pauses and then states
his view. “I don’t think anyone wants to think about a mouse in a hotel.” Hilton realizes
that Don is obviously right, even though he admits that the ad campaign was his idea.
Chagrined, he asks, “You got something better?.” And the courting dance continues. 
11 Here is the background for the second scene that we want to consider. The staff in the
office of Don’s agency becomes aware that there has been a terrible crash of an American
Airlines plane in NY. Presumably everyone is lost. There is black humor around the office
about the crash. One of the executives at the agency, Duck, claims to have a personal
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relationship with a high level executive at American Airlines. Duck knows that American
Airlines is very worried about how the crash will affect the company. He believes that
they will be looking for a new ad agency. He also believes that their agency can hook
them. In a horrible twist of fate, one of the most ambitious young executives in the office,
Pete Campbell, learns that his father, with whom he did not get along, died in the crash.
In spite of this loss, Duck wants Pete to join him in a meeting with his contact, Shel, at the
university club. Pete, naturally, feels very uncomfortable. He doesn’t think he can do it. 
12 The scene that we wish to consider opens with Duck sitting in the university club with
Shel (Mad Men, 2008). The lighting is low and they are comfortably ensconced in leather
chairs, drinks nearby. But things are not going well. Shel is hedging, claiming that it’s
going to be tough to switch to a new agency. Then Pete shows up. Duck introduces him to
Shel as his agency’s best. Shel reiterates, we don’t know where we are yet. Pete tries a
typical sales pitch, asserting how enthusiastic they are about working with American
Airlines. Shel is not moved. And then Pete says, “We understand how delicate the process
of rebuilding the public’s confidence will be.” Shel responds, “It’s not just the public, our
stock holders.” Pete replies, “I want you to know that should you decide to bring us your
business there will be someone on your account who knows exactly what you are going
through […] My father was on that plane.” Shel is shaken and moved. It is something he
will pass on, that is, report to his colleagues. The audience is left with the impression that
Pete’s revelation might have helped salvage the deal. 
13 Scene three doesn’t involve the agency (Mad Men, 2009B). It takes place in an elementary
school classroom. Don and his wife, Betty, have been called in for a teacher’s conference
because their daughter, Sally, has been acting out and fighting in school. Betty is very
pregnant and quiet.  She clearly looks depressed,  even pained.  The teacher,  Susan,  is
young and earnest. She presses Don and Betty about their daughter’s behavior. Betty,
coolly emotional, reports, “My, um, father passed away (pause) last week, week before,
two weeks now.” Susan becomes agitated and extremely apologetic. She walks over and
holds Betty’s hand, saying, “I feel terrible for bringing that up for you.” Susan then asks,
“Is this grandpa Gene we are talking about? Uh, that poor thing.” (Referring to their
daughter). If only she (Susan) had known. How horrible! Susan continues, “Now I know
why she was asking all of those questions about Medgar Evers’ murder.” Betty leaves the
room and Susan discusses how Sally needs more attention with Don. She says that Sally is
grieving.  Of  course  she  now understands  their  daughter’s  behavior.  Susan tells  Don,
“There is a special pain to losing someone at that age. I don’t know if you can understand
that.” Don responds with a simple, “I can.” Betty returns. 
14 The fourth scene is a follow-up to the classroom exchange (Mad Men, 2009B). That evening
Susan calls Don and Betty at home. Don answers. The camera shifts back and forth from
Don to Susan. Susan is smiling at first with a drink in hand. She has called to apologize
about their meeting. Don wonders why. Susan becomes very serious. “My father died
when I was eight and I might have overdone it relating to Sally in that way […] I guess I
can get caught up in things and lose perspective.” (There is a subtext here. Susan and Don
appear to be attracted to each other, which adds further complexity to the interactions in
the classroom, but we will pass on them here). 
15 In terms of how these scenes relate to simulation theory, let’s start with the classroom
scene first. If Goldman were to apply simulation theory to the people in this scene, it is
unlikely that he would focus solely on low-level emotional simulation, which typically
involves the presence of the person to whom one is responding. Susan, the teacher, seems
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to be reacting to Betty in this fashion, although it is possible to interpret her reaction to
Betty as also involving higher level simulation. But it is not Betty’s state that is the most
obvious target for a higher level simulation. It is her daughter’s. The teacher uses her
own feelings and beliefs, her own mental state, to help ascertain how Betty and Don’s
daughter must be feeling because of the loss. Yet on reflection Susan is aware that she
may have overreacted due to the loss of her father as a child. Besides violating the rules
of  decorum, she may not  have simulated Sally correctly,  and she definitely failed to
simulate Don’s state of mind. He had in fact experienced the loss of his father as a child. If
simulation is a process that is mediated by one’s own mental states, then there is always
the possibility of misreading or failure due to an egocentric bias, according to Goldman.
And this raises the issue of projection, which Goldman addresses.
I shall call the act of assigning a state of one’s own to someone else projection […]
[P]rojection is a standard part of the ST story of mindreading. It is the final stage of
each mindreading act,  a stage that involves no (further) simulation or pretense.
Indeed, it typically involves an “exit” from the simulation mode that occupies the
first stage of a two-stage routine. (Goldman 2006: 40)
16 But if projection is a basic feature of ST, and if the model is best understood as simulation
plus projection, how are we to avoid egocentric biases? There must be some mechanism
that prevents us from getting too carried away with our own beliefs and emotions, as did
Susan, when we are seeking to mindread. For Goldman the answer is that we quarantine
“genuine states that don’t correspond to states of the target,” thereby keeping them out
of  the  simulation.  If  they  should  intrude,  “biases  are  likely  to  result.  If  leakage  or
quarantine failure is rampant, egocentric biases will also be rampant” (Goldman 2006: 41).
Further, while simulation requires a projection stage, it is possible that we might have
projection without simulation.2 Preventing unwarranted projections involves inhibition.
In Goldman’s words,
Quarantine  prevents  something  from  happening  that  might  otherwise  occur;
specifically, it prevents one’s own states from being projected onto the target. In
neural terms, such prevention is inhibition. It might be described as “inhibiting the
self-perspective.”  If  simulation  is  a  major  facet  of  third-person  mindreading,
successful mindreading should involve inhibition of the self-perspective. (Goldman
2006: 170)
17 Goldman needs “inhibition” for his model to work. But he doesn’t actually provide an
account of the development of inhibitory mechanisms. In the section of Simulating Minds
on egocentrism and projection, he presents us with behavioral studies of egocentric bias
that are “interpretable within the projection framework” (Goldman 2006: 165).  In the
next section, “The Neuropsychology of Quarantine,” he turns to a case study involving a
stroke victim. Goldman informs us that, “someone impaired in the ability to inhibit the
self-perspective should have trouble producing accurate mindreading. This is what ST
predicts, and this prediction is dramatically confirmed in the case of a particular stroke
patient” (Goldman 2006: 170). The damage done to this stroke victim was in a region of
the brain that one study “highlighted as possibly sustaining the ability to inhibit one’s
own perspective” (Goldman 2006: 171). So we have the case study of one patient (WBA),
who is having problems inhibiting her own perspective, who has suffered damage to a
region of the brain, a region which possibly has something to do with inhibiting one’s own
perspective, according to another study. Goldman concludes from these two studies, “it is
natural  to  infer  that  inhibition  of  self-perspective  is  a  vital  aspect  of  mindreading”
(Goldman 2006: 172).3 Something like the inhibition of self-perspective may very well be a
part  of  mindreading,  but  one case study and one study of  a  brain region isn’t  solid
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evidence. At best Goldman has suggestive results that may point to a necessary condition,
a part of the brain that needs to be functioning in order for x to happen, without an
explanation of x.4 A mature theory of how inhibition develops is never presented.5 And
such a  theory  would  at  minimum have  to  address  what  an  effective,  as  opposed  to
“accurate,” simulation would mean in different cultural and social contexts, because what
we inhibit is not simply a matter of how accurate, if that is the correct term, we need to
be,  but  how effective we want or intend to be.6 To explore how the intention to be
effective might complicate the picture for simulationists, let’s return to the first scene.
18 Recall that Conrad Hilton has asked Don to his hotel suite for some free advice and to test
him. Don understands the game. He can’t simply give free advice if he is going to be seen
as a valuable player. But he accedes to Connie’s request anyway. However, he does so only
after lighting a cigarette and allowing himself a pregnant pause, as if to say, ‘ok, here is
your advice, no effort involved’. If we interpret his response in terms of simulation, in
evaluating the mock-ups Don would be placing himself in the shoes of prospective hotel
guest(s) through imagination, and then after processing his pretend beliefs,  he would
project them back on to the target, the hotel guest. How would she react? She would be
turned off to ads with mice. 
19 Without going into the details  of  the theory theory versus simulation debate in any
depth, I do want briefly to raise the issue here of which model might better explain Don’s
reaction. According to Joe Cruz and Gordon,
What unifies theory theorists is the view that attributing inner states and making
sense of the behavior of others is carried out by a capacity that deploys knowledge
encoded in a theory. The most straightforward sense in which ST is opposed to TT
is  that  simulation theorists  deny that  our capacity  to  attribute mental  states  is
subsumed by a  body of  knowledge about  the minds of  others.  Rather,  our  own
mental  processes  are  treated  as  a  manipulable  model  of  other  minds.  (Cruz  &
Gordon 2005)
20 So perhaps Don didn’t simulate hotel guests at all. Perhaps he simply inferred, relatively
quickly, from his knowledge of people and their aversions, that associating a hotel with a
mouse is a bad idea. Since both Goldman and Gordon have conceded that we employ
theory at times to read others, how are we to decide whether Don did so in this case? In
this particular situation I submit that there is no way. He could have used theory or
simulation or both. The interaction can’t tell us. How might we tell? Well, if you are a
certain kind of cognitive scientist you will argue that different regions or networks of the
brain may be involved if we are using theory instead of simulation to read a target. 
21 However, what complicates our answer to this question is not only our limited knowledge
of the brain but the complexity of the situation itself. If we go back to the scene, we will
see that Don is never simply engaged in mindreading in relationship to a prospective
hotel guest. He is also seeking to place himself in the best light in relationship to Connie.
He needs an effortless and convincing answer. Perhaps there wasn’t any simulation or
theory in play at all regarding the hotel guests. Perhaps it was all a show for Connie. Don
has read Connie through his knowledge of men of a certain age and class background,
etc.,  and/or  he  has  read  his  facial  expressions  and body  language,  allowing  him to
simulate features of Connie’s emotional state. He concluded that any assertive answer
was  better  than  none.  After  all,  Don  had  a  strategic  intention.  His  goal  was  not  to
mindread prospective guests but to convince Connie. Or possibly there wasn’t any theory
or simulation involved in his response, only behavioral cues, ones that he may have been
little aware of, but which still allowed him to make the call. Yet even if this was all that he
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was  doing,  he  was  in  some sense  taking  the  perspective  of  the  other,  although not
through simulation or theory. His perspective taking might better be viewed as a form of
interpersonal  praxis,  about  which I  will  have much to say shortly.  In any case,  it  is
important to note that there was a strategic dance between Don and Connie, one that
probably  involved  multiple  sorts  of  interactions,  some  better  understood  in  terms
effective interaction rather than accurate simulation.7 
22 There is a group of social psychologists, several at Simon Fraser University, who have
developed a neo-Meadian approach to agency, in part in response to TT and ST. At first it
may be somewhat difficult to see just how they differ from the simulation theorists. There
is an extraordinary emphasis in their framework on taking the perspective of the other,
which can be framed in terms of stepping into the other guy’s shoes, an expression which
Goldman and other simulationists often use. And like the simulationists they often cite
studies  that  show  how  infants  are  interactive  and  engage  in  incipient  intentional
behavior (e.g., gaze following) from an early age, that is, prelinguistically. But they don’t
conceptualize our relationship to others in the same fashion. Here is how three of them,
Jack Martin, Bryan Sokol, and Theo Elfers, frame the differences. 
Whereas simulation and theory theorists tend to think about perspective taking in
cognitive and mentalistic terms supported by neurophysiological mechanisms, we
locate  perspective  taking,  its  emergence,  and  its  development  within  the
coordinated interactivity and conduct of infants, children, adolescents, and adults
with  objects  and  others  in  the  biophysical  and  sociocultural  world.  For  us, the
development  of  our  abilities  to  work  with  and  through  perspectives  is  not an
instantiation or stimulation of preexisting mental concepts and structures. It is a
situated,  embodied,  dynamic,  and  coordinated  way  of  being  and  conducting
ourselves  with  others  and  things  that  moves  from  a  social,  interactive  to  a
psychological, intersubjective footing during ontogenesis. However, even with this
graduated emergence of more advanced psychological aspects, perspective taking
never loses its situated, embodied foundation. As we interact in a world of objects
and others, our orientations are constantly shifting, forming, and transforming in
interaction with the activities and orientations of others. It is within this ongoing
interaction and coordination that  the generative  processes of  our  psychological
lives are located. (Martin, Sokol, Elfers 2008: 295-6)
23 Part of the difficulty in distinguishing the approach of the interactionists from that of the
simulationists revolves around the phrase “taking the perspective (or role) of the other.”
Simulationists such as Goldman tend to see this activity in terms of low-level mimicry and
emotional contagion, or as an explicit attempt to predict how a target will respond using
pretend-states,  which  appears  to  involve  stepping  into  the  other  guy’s  shoes.  Mead
incorrectly denied the sort of imitation that we find in infants and young children, an
error that neo-Meadians do not make. But Mead does supply us with a distinction that is
crucial here. For Mead, taking the perspective or role of the other can be seen as taking
the attitude of the other. According to Gary Cook,
We can avoid some of the misleading connotations of the phrase “taking the role of
the other” by using in its stead the alternative phrase Mead himself often employs,
namely,  “taking  the  attitude  of  the  other.”  An  attitude,  he  says,  consists  of  a
behavioral disposition, a tendency to respond in a certain manner to certain sorts
of stimuli, or the beginnings of an action that seek an occasion for a full release or
expression. (Cook 1993: 79)
24 When we see two boxers or fencers feinting and parrying, we might say that they are
predicting the decision of the other in order to make a decision of their own. Yet, this is
not the sort of decision state that allows time for determining the belief states of the
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opponent.  Nor  is  there  simple  mimicry  taking  place.  The opponents  are  taking  the
attitude of the other in order to respond. There is anticipation of the other but it is not
reflective anticipation. So here we have an interactional state that requires a form of
taking the perspective of the other but one that is not easily accommodated by the way in
which either Goldman or Gordon describe simulation. Of course one can say that they are
talking about simulation in terms of mindreading while I am now addressing another
phenomenon. This would be a mistake. Much of what they take to be simulation is better
described in terms of taking the attitude of the other. And by failing to see perspective
taking in attitudinal terms, in addition to mimicry and explicit role taking, we drop out
crucial resources for describing how agents navigate social worlds. Further, why should
simulationists be allowed to define how the phrase “taking the perspective of the other”
is understood.
25 How might the neo-Meadians’ approach cash out in relationship to ST? They would be
much more interested in how the dynamic interaction of the agents is responsible for the
ways in which they interpret the world and others. Of course this is not to say that there
aren’t  biological,  theoretical,  and  “introspective”  factors  at  play.  It  is  to  say  that
perspective taking, attitude taking, is a process that is in itself transformative. But just to
make sure that there is no misunderstanding: the neo-Medians aren’t claiming that we
don’t have well-settled habits and beliefs. If we didn’t, we wouldn’t be able to anticipate
what others might say or do. However, we also know that our anticipations are modified
in ongoing interaction, even if only to a modest degree, and this complicates the picture
for the simulationists.8 Let’s turn to the third scene to clarify the differences further.
26 Pete, the young executive in Don’s agency, wants to sign American Airlines. He enters the
university club where his colleague, Duck, is meeting with Shel from AA. Both Duck and
Shel  appear  uncomfortable.  Duck  wants  a  deal  but  Shel  isn’t  moving  in  the  right
direction. Pete can see that Duck has not made much progress and he begins a traditional
pitch: We really want your business and we are excited about the opportunity to work
with you. But it’s not working. Then the young ad man says, my father was on the plane.
Shel is clearly taken aback. But what is he thinking? He seems to know immediately that
this piece of information is game changer. If you are a simulationist, you might say that
Shel is already placing himself imaginatively in the mind of the young exec, and through
recognizing the extent of his loss, he is in a position to hypothesize and conclude that
Pete  might  have  a  unique  vantage  point  from  which  to  help repair  the  airline’s
reputation.  Or  perhaps Shel  cannot  dismiss  Pete because he is  having a  sympathetic
reaction to his loss, that is, he is having an emotional response. Or perhaps both of these
are occurring, that is, sympathy and simulation involving strategic calculation. But for
our purposes the key to their interaction is  that it  is  instigated by the shock of  the
unanticipated. Pete made a tactical decision to use his own tragic circumstances to get
business.9 The airline executive thinks that he is reading Pete correctly when he starts his
first traditional pitch. And then Shel is surprised, no, shocked by Pete’s revelation, and he
has to recalibrate on hearing the news. But his new reading isn’t merely observational. It
is attitudinal and interactive. And Pete is also modulating his presentation in reaction to
Shel’s responses. Feint and parry. In this situation, all of the agents are recalibrating in
light of a novel revelation. How often does someone tell you that his father has died in the
plane of the company that you represent? 
27 Although this scene involves an extraordinary revelation, the neo-Meadians would argue
that less dramatic intrusions of novelty regularly occur in our social interactions and that
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their approach is well suited to addressing these events. Novel situations help people
learn to be adaptable and flexible, which in turn assists them in developing their capacity
for taking more than one perspective at the same time – or to be more exact, at the
practical and functional equivalent of “at the same time.”10 And learning how to take
more than one perspective “simultaneously” in turn allows us to grapple with novel
situations.  We have here a virtuous circle.  As Jack Martin,  Jeff  Sugarman,  and Sarah
Hickinbottom note,
For  Mead,  sociality  consists  of  the  ability  to  occupy  two  or  more  different
perspectives at the same time. The relation of an organism and an environment is
continuously dynamic.  The natural and social  world consists of a multiplicity of
perspectives, any one of which may enter into an organism’s field of activity. It is
by virtue of the organism’s ability to be several things simultaneously, in the sense
of taking up (acting within) two or more different perspectives, that the organism is
able  to  deal  with  emergent  events  or  novel,  unexpected  occurrences.  (Martin,
Sugarman & Hickenbottom 2010: 123-4)11 
28 Recall  that  in  at  least  three  of  the  four  scenes  that  have  been  described,  multiple
perspectives were potentially in play, and this more accurately comports with more of
our social life than does the taking of the perspective of a specific other regarding a
particular belief or emotion. Of course we do the latter but even when engaged with one
person there is often a multiplicity of perspectives operative on the horizon, a horizon
that we anticipate may shift due to novel reactions. In addition, much of our social life is
group life. And here is where the ability to take multiple perspectives is most obviously in
play. Without addressing this phenomenon or its implications our ethical reflections are
impoverished. This impoverishment can be seen in the manner in which Gordon discusses
the relationship between impartiality and empathy or sympathy.12 But before turning to
Gordon, a few words on Goldman’s attempt to join ethics and empathy at the hip are in
order. 
29 In his 1993 article,  “Ethics and Cognitive Science,” as well as in his 1992 presidential
address to the Pacific  Division of  the APA,  Goldman demonstrated that he was quite
prepared to use the term empathy to describe forms of simulation. (Goldman 1993, 1992).
13 In Simulating Minds we learn that in ethics empathy probably comes into play at both
the level of compassion, care, and concern for the other and at the epistemic level, that is,
through helping to clarify what the other may be experiencing (Goldman 2006:  298).
Goldman does not claim that empathy can in and of itself make us moral, only that it can
be an important component of moral practice if assisted by other tools. For example, one
of the problems with focusing on empathy is the danger of parochialism, that is, we tend
to be more empathic toward those who are more like us and spatially closer.14 To counter
this  we  need  to  extend  our  empathetic  sensibilities.  Goldman  uses  what  he  calls
enactment imagination, or E-imagination, to explain how we can counter parochialism.
“To accurately E-imagine the situation of an anonymous and distant individual, it helps to
receive detailed information about that person’s life experience and an image of her and
her immediate environment. Thus, news coverage of ongoing wars, famines, and other
catastrophes  are  more  effective  when  they  supply  biographical  details  of  selected
individuals, as well as photographs or visual footage” (Goldman 2006: 297-8).
30 Heightening our empathic responses may play a role in altruistic actions. But presumably
we must also defeat our egocentric biases. As we saw, Goldman appeals to the notions of
quarantine and inhibition to keep egocentric biases in check.  However,  there doesn’t
appear to be a connection between these mechanisms and the social development of the
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self or group dynamics. To his credit, Gordon seeks to tie our ability to distance ourselves
from what could be called egocentric biases to our ability to become an other, that is, to a
form of sociality, although his model limits his success. 
31 In his 1995 paper, “Sympathy, Simulation, and the Impartial Spectator,” Gordon must
confront a basic problem for his approach. Recall that for Gordon we transform ourselves
into the other when we simulate.  If  transformation is truly successful,  we in a sense
become the other, as does the actor who is fully engaged in playing a role (Gordon 1995:
734-5).  But  if  we  become  the  other,  then  we  lose  the  ability  to  evaluate  the  other
critically, whether we are talking about ethics or other tasks, such as giving advice. How
do we avoid falling into this trap? Gordon appeals to Adam Smith for assistance.
According to Smith, rather than simply respond to another’s pleasure with pleasure
and to another’s suffering with suffering, we find ourselves turning our attention to
the  cause  of  the  other's  emotion.  We  imagine  ourselves  being  in  the  other’s
situation, ourselves faced with whatever is causing the other's emotion. Then, in
imagination, we respond independently, in our own way, to the imagined cause.
(Gordon 1995: 741)
32 But although Smith is on the right track here he fails to make a distinction that Gordon
deems salient, between what the other is experiencing and our own experience. To show
this he quotes Smith. 
As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea
of the manner in which they are affected,  but by conceiving what we ourselves
should feel in the like situation. (Gordon 1995: 741)
33 For  Gordon,  simply  imagining  how we  would  feel  would  result  in  our  transforming
simulation into a form of projection, which would be deadly for his transformational
model, and render it especially useless in making ethical evaluations.15 What does Gordon
propose? We must distinguish “between just imagining being in X’s situation and making
the further adjustments required to imagine being X in X’s situation” (Gordon 1995: 741).
In other words, we must separate merely imagining being in someone else’s situation from
imagining being that person in  his  or  her  situation.  The latter  can lead to  an over-
identification with the other. I in a sense become the other. The former – that is, merely
imagining – allows us to still say, “If I were you, I would […],” with an implicit, “but I am
also not you,” factored in. If we perform both of these operations, we can then compare
our responses. In Gordon’s words, “If your response is the same in each case, approve X’s
conduct; if not, disapprove” (Gordon 1995: 741). He goes no further with this analysis and
moves on to the problem of self-judgment, to which we will turn momentarily. He seems
to think that it is enough that he has provided us with a decision procedure. How a rift
between  these  two  imaginary  states  provides  an  impartial  vantage  point  is  never
addressed. So in spite of the title of the article, with its promissory note of addressing
impartiality, what Gordon appears to be offering us is a method for holding back so that
we don’t immediately assent to the actions of others. Or as he has told us earlier, “unlike
the  explanation  or  prediction  of  behavior,  moral  assessment  requires  holding  back”
(Gordon 1995: 740). If we don’t hold back we may find ourselves flooded by the other’s
emotion and unable to judge. But while the activity of holding back may be of assistance,
it certainly doesn’t produce impartiality, even if we define the term generously.16
34 Gordon tells us that there is one problem with the analysis he presented regarding the
decision procedure. How can we handle judging ourselves? We can’t use our own beliefs
or conduct as we might when we judge someone else, for it is our own conduct that we
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may have to disapprove. Again, he turns to Smith for assistance and quotes the following
passage from The Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
When I endeavor to examine my own conduct […] I divide myself, as it were, into
two persons; […] I, the examiner and judge, represent a different character from
that other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of. The first is
the spectator, whose sentiments with regard to my own conduct I endeavour to
enter  into,  by placing myself  in  his  situation,  and by considering how it  would
appear to me,  when seen from that  particular  point  of  view.  The second is  the
agent, the person whom I properly call myself. (Gordon 1995: 741-2; Smith 1976:
113)
35 It’s obvious for Gordon that in simulating someone else I can “be out of sympathy with
myself” (Gordon, 1995: 742).17 The problem for him is how can I distance myself from my
own emotions and motivation when I am the spectator “with my selfsame emotions and
motivation” (Gordon 1995: 742). In answering this question Gordon ends his article with
the following words, 
It can happen only if the very process of becoming a spectator, and of coming to
regard myself as an other, changes me. I believe that the process does change us,
and that this was Smith’s contention, too. But the topic is a complex one: observing
myself trying to argue the case in a paragraph or two, I see a lot of hand waving. So
I will not try. Q.E.D. (Gordon 1995: 742)
36 Yes, too cute and clever by half. But Gordon was actually on to something here, although I
cannot  locate  any  place  in  which  he  followed up  on  this  discussion.  In  response  to
Gordon’s words, a neo-Meadian would say: precisely, the process does change us.  For
example,  an  impartial  spectator  would  never  have  arisen  without  the  to  and  fro  of
perspective taking, although this is not the only condition.18 Mead refers to the ability to
place  oneself  between two perspectives,  or  systems,  as  sociality.  And it  includes  the
experience of being “caught” or suspended between one’s own perspective and that of
another. This is indeed transformative and we learn how to do this as socially interactive
or transactive persons. We are self and other, and can be both self and other. But ST, in
either Goldman’s or Gordon’s versions, is not the best way to capture this interactivity
because it is grounded in a model of subjectivity that views the self as requiring a bridge –
whether it is one of emotional contagion, imagination, or theory – to overcome the self’s
separation from the other. No doubt we employ these mechanisms in interacting but we
don’t require them in the manner that Goldman and Gordon suggest.19 Briefly here is how
Mead and the neo-Meadians would tell the story. 
37 For Mead, the taking of the perspective of others is the condition for the possibility of
self-consciousness  and  self-criticism.  Through  the  reflexivity  involved  in  linguistic
interaction the  capacity  for  perspective-taking is  nurtured,  although it  certainly  has
proto-versions in the interactivity of infants. Specifically, Mead addresses the importance
of the vocal gesture in setting the stage for the reflexivity that is made possible by role-
taking. For neo-Meadians there is a smooth trajectory from infant interactions through
early symbolic interactions. In learning to speak one must be able to hear the other as
one hears oneself.  This proto-role taking sets the stage for taking the perspective of
others in more complex social interactions that we call roles. In order to play roles, we
must be able to take the position of the other, as well as our own, and invert them. This is
a form of stepping into the other guy’s shoes but it is interactive from the get-go. As
interactions increase we develop a capacity for taking multiple perspectives. Mead uses
the game to illustrate this. If I am playing baseball, and I am the pitcher or third baseman,
in order to play the game I must be able to take the perspective of everyone else on the
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team.  Is  this  mindreading?  Not  as  Goldman  understands  it.  There  may  not  be  any
introspection at all and yet I am engaged in multiple perspectives. Of course there can be
introspection, especially when problems arise. But this phenomenon emerges out of my
developing  ability  to  take  multiple  perspectives.  I  “see”  myself  from  different
perspectives and the perspective of the whole, that is, the generalized other. The latter
allows me to see myself or an aspect of myself, depending on how one is defining the self,
as if I were the (generalized) other. For neo-Meadians, the taking of multiple perspectives
contributes to the development of what might be called an impartial spectator, although
as a pragmatist, Mead would never view impartiality as a perfectly calibrated neutrality.
There is no view from the mountaintop. 
38 There  is  much  that  could  be  said  here  about  how  one  can’t  generate  an  impartial
spectator from Gordon’s or Goldman’s models, as they stand. This not only has to do with
the lack of interactivity in their approaches, which is one of the conditions for generating
a sense of impartiality. It is because their models do not provide the tools for addressing
how groups enter into our experience as a unique sort of third person, what Mead refers
to as the generalized other. Most of the time when interacting in groups I do not simulate
a group mind, that is, try to figure out what everyone is thinking or believing. I imbibe its
patterns of behavior as I interact within the group. These patterns, which are akin to
Bourdieu’s habitus, play a fundamental role in generating perspectives that transcend the
self/other dynamic. In short, if we want to use the notion of empathy to develop a robust
ethical theory, we need to see it in terms of sympathy and interactive perspective-taking
20. Further, we need to view people as agents, not targets, who will behave unpredictably,
and whose unpredictability is factored into their sociality by others. In this way we may
avoid viewing empathy as an escape hatch for subjects seeking to break away from the
similarly wired black boxes of their own minds. 
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NOTES
1. If successful advertising utilizes simulation, it does so for strategic reasons. Ad men, mad men,
aren’t interested in mutual understanding in the manner in which Habermas would define it. No,
they are interested in figuring out the other in order to manipulate him or her. 
2. “Given our definition of projection, taking a genuine state of one’s own and ascribing that
state to another is clearly a case of projection. Is it  a case of simulation-plus-projection? We
might consider it a ‘limiting case’ of simulation-plus-projection, a case in which the simulation
element is null but the projection element is robust” (Goldman 2006: 41).
3. Here  is  the  key  paragraph.  “Of  crucial  importance,  the  evidence  from  WBA  appears  to
demonstrate that the root of at least some egocentric errors in mindreading is failure to inhibit,
or quarantine, self-perspective. This, of course, is precisely ST’s story. Because Samson et al.’s
evidence about WBA, along with evidence from Vogeley et al. (2001), points to a particular brain
region as responsible for this function, it is natural to infer that inhibition of self-perspective is a
vital aspect of mindreading” (Goldman 2006: 172). Notice that he gives himself wiggle room at the
start  of  the  passage  by  qualifying  the  claim  with  an  italicized  “some.”  By  the  end  of  the
paragraph we have a more general (natural) inference: “inhibition of self-perspective is a vital
aspect of mindreading.” Both of these remarks must be placed in the context of the manner in
Through the Eyes of Mad Men
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, III-2 | 2011
13
which he began the discussion. At the start of, “Egocentrism and Projection,” he states, “There is
an extensive literature on egocentric biases in mindreading, and this section and the next one
[“The Neuropsychology of Quarantine”] argue that these egocentric biases are best explained by
the simulation-plus-projection model” (Goldman 2006: 164). 
4. To make matters worse, instead of providing any further discussion of his own account of
inhibition, Goldman then launches into how TT can not account for the finding of “widespread
egocentrism” (Goldman 2006: 172-3).
5. In Simulating Minds Goldman also discusses evidence from childhood studies that suggest there
is a connection between inhibitory control and performance on false belief tasks. “Problems with
standard false-belief tasks are problems with inhibiting the first-person perspective (section 8.4),
which should be distinguished from (problems with) adopting a third-person perspective” (292).
He notes that there is a study that challenges the connection between false-belief task errors and
inhibition. (To counter this study, Goldman appeals once again to the stroke victim.) To be fair to
Goldman, there are other features of his model – for example, the inputs used for simulation –
that could lead to problems that we associate with forms of egocentrism, in spite of the fact that
he links projection and egocentrism in the sections of the book discussed above (see, note #4).
However, these would be due to failures in the simulation stage, not to a failure to inhibit self-
perspective, which is directly linked to the projection stage. It is the former, understood in terms
of empathy, that will play an important role in considering the implications of ST for ethics,
while the latter – that is, inhibition – touches on the question of impartiality. 
6. The  latter  would  apparently  involve  “decision  procedures”  for  determining  degrees  of
“accuracy.” It’s interesting to note that at the beginning of the discussion of egocentrism and
projection, Goldman sidesteps the issue of when being influenced by one’s own “genuine” states
is appropriate. “Projection occurs when a genuine, nonpretend state of the attributor seeps into
the simulation routine despite its inappropriateness (as judged by information the attributor
possesses). This results in an attribution that is inappropriately influenced by the attributor's
own current  states  (genuine,  nonpretend states).  I  won’t  try  to  settle  the question of  when,
exactly, being influenced by one’s own genuine states is inappropriate” (Goldman 2006: 165). I
would be very curious to know what kind of answer to this question could possibly be envisioned
from within his model. 
7. Note  that  in  spite  of  the  ambiguities  in  the  situation  and alternative  explanations,  Don’s
responses could still be interpreted in terms of simulation or theory theory by committed ST or
TT theorists.
8. While of course there must be constancy of beliefs and habits if we are to function with others,
there must also be an ongoing assumption that others are not thinking or believing what we
assume. This pragmatic fallibilism is built into interactions with which we are all familiar. When
a parent says that she knows Johnny like the back of her hand in the morning, and then says in
the afternoon, “that’s my Johnny, you can never figure out what he is going to do next,” we don’t
accuse her of violating the laws of logic. The fact is that both things can well be true. Of course
we can “predict” or anticipate what others will do but we also quite regularly fail at this. Much of
the time we got it right enough to function reasonably well with others. And so-called failures to
“mindread” should not be understood in terms of not reading a target properly due to lack of
knowledge about inputs and outputs. People are not targets in this fashion. They are persons. As
persons  one of  their  leading characteristics  is  their  ability  to  surprise  us,  in  little  ways,  for
example, that permit conversations to continue, and in big ways. 
9. We don’t know if he knew in advance that he was going raise his father’s death. He may have
surprised himself by doing so, which raises another set of questions that we will let pass.
10. By  using  the  phrase  “at  the  same  time”  here  I  do  not  mean  to  imply  that  multiple
perspectives may not involve split second switches from one to the other. The phrase is meant to
suggest the practical and functional reality of taking multiple perspectives at once.
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11. The passage continues, “Because persons are themselves social, their perspective taking may
be enhanced greatly by communication with others through significant symbols” (124).
12. Gordon does not make any systematic distinction between empathy and sympathy in the
article that we will be discussing (Gordon 1995). 
13. Portions of  “Ethics and Cognitive Science” (Goldman 1993) are identical  to the published
version of Goldman’s Presidential Address to the Pacific Division of the APA (Goldman 1992). 
14. The notion that similarity is a significant factor in how much empathy we feel for strangers
has been questioned in an experiment involving age and occupation. See Batson et al. 2005. 
15. Smith emphasizes different aspects of sympathy in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. We are not
confined to our own feelings nearly as much as this quotation would suggest. See, for example,
Smith (1976: 317). 
16. It’s  worth  noting  here  how  Goldman  and  Gordon  seem  to  have  opposite  problems:  one
worries about egocentric bias, the other about being overwhelmed by the emotions of the other.
Nevertheless, in the end they have a similar weakness. They don’t have a developed account of
the genesis of judgment as it emerges through social interaction.
17. As mentioned in footnote #13, Gordon does not systematically distinguish between empathy
and sympathy in this article. For the most part this is not problematic given his goals. But note
that when he uses the phrase “sympathy with oneself,” it would be difficult to replace it with
“empathy  with  oneself.”  The  terms  have  different  connotations  in  contemporary  American
English. Using “sympathy” in this context appears to help move Gordon’s argument along. The
terms should be more carefully distinguished. 
18. Psychopaths  can  successfully  take  perspectives  and  yet  lack  concern  for  others,  in  all
likelihood due to emotional deficits (see Goldman 2006: 293-4; and Prinz 2006: 32).
19. Sometimes simulationists sound as if they are trying to create a clear telephonic connection
between the self  and other.  But  a  better  metaphor for  much of  our social  lives  is  the game
telephone,  in  which  the  original  input  is  rarely  identical  to  the  output,  as  each  participant
transforms, even if only slightly, the meaning intended in the first person’s words. Paradoxically,
this  suggests  how  close  we  are  to  the  other,  not  how  remote,  when  seen  through  the
interactionist’s lens. It seems that the problem of other minds is still setting the stage for the
reflections of the simulationists,  when it’s time to let the “problem” drift off into history, as
Dewey would suggest.
20. In  a  forthcoming  article  (Prinz  2011),  “Is  Empathy  Necessary  for  Morality?”  Jesse  Prinz
responds to the question in his title with a fairly resounding, yet qualified, no. It is qualified
because he leaves open the possibility that “empathic concern” may well play an important role
in morality  (Prinz 2011).  I  view Prinz’s  piece as  a  corrective to exaggerated claims for  what
empathy  can  accomplish  for  moral  actors,  if  by  empathy  we  mean  a  kind  of  emotional
vicariousness,  which  is  what  Prinz  addresses.  There  is  no  doubt  that  “empathy”  has  been
overplayed in popular, as well as some scholarly, literature of late. However, I would argue that
Prinz in turn has overplayed his hand in this article. His definition of empathy is circumscribed;
for example, he tells us that, “We cannot empathize with a group, except by considering each
member” (Prinz, 17 online version). And his reading of the research appears weighted toward
supporting his own model – which emphasizes the importance of non-empathic emotions, for
example,  guilt  and anger – through undermining the role of  a  type of  empathy in morality.
Although, I tend to agree with him about the importance of some of the “emotions” he mentions,
his model ends up offering us an either/or – empathy or his preferred emotions – in spite of a
few caveats here and there that empathy may not be completely without value. He also dismisses
in a rather cavalier  fashion the merit  of  a  cosmopolitan outlook,  which he views in Kantian
terms. I hope to address some of the limitations of Prinz’s approach in the future. His article is
currently available on the web [subcortex.com/]. For an alternative view of cosmopolitanism, see
Aboulafia 2010.
Through the Eyes of Mad Men
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, III-2 | 2011
15
ABSTRACTS
Traditionally  pragmatists  have  been  favorably  disposed  to  improving  our  understanding  of
agency and ethics through the use of  empirical  research. In the last  two decades simulation
theory has been championed in certain cognitive science circles as a way of explaining how we
attribute mental states and predict human behavior.  Drawing on research in psychology and
neuroscience, Alvin I. Goldman and Robert M. Gordon have not only used simulation theory to
discuss how we “mindread,” but have suggested that the theory has implications for ethics. The
limitations of simulation theory for “mindreading” and ethics are addressed in this article from
an  interactionist  or  neo-Meadian  pragmatic  perspective.  To  demonstrate  the  limitations  of
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